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Democratic Hopes in the Polycentric City
Loren A. King
Brown University
The polycentric model of municipal governance suggests that multiple jurisdictions may approximate
an efficient market for local public services: citizens move to jurisdictions offering services they value
at tax rates they are willing and able to pay. The model is appealing to political theorists for its empha-
sis on free association and responsive governance, but problematic insofar as institutions prescribed
by the model permit exclusionary practices and objectionable inequalities. I argue for a revised con-
ception of polycentricity: efficient spatial patterns of boundaries and services are acceptable only if
they are consistent with (inter alia) fair opportunities for both mobility and loyalty to place. This sug-
gests a vision of the polycentric city in which fairness and contestation are as important as freedom
and efficiency.
The polycentric model of municipal governance suggests that multiple juris-
dictions may approximate an efficient market for a range of public services. As
a normative ideal, the model should appeal to liberals and libertarians for its
emphasis on freedoms of choice and association: citizens are free to move to
jurisdictions that provide the services they value, at the price they are willing and
able to pay. When preferences, service quality, tax rates, and budget constraints
change, citizens are free to move to more suitable jurisdictions. The model should
also be attractive to communitarian and republican democrats: citizens sort them-
selves according to shared values and preferences, and political authority is
vested in relatively small and independent jurisdictions, allowing citizens to have
real influence over decisions that directly affect their lives. And of course few
theorists would deny the appeal of efficient and responsive government.
But any ideal of governance that appeals to both libertarians and republicans,
liberals and communitarians, perhaps ought to give us pause, and indeed a tension
is evident between the liberal and democratic commitments of this ideal: the 
polycentric approach threatens to sustain exclusionary political practices and dra-
matic inequalities of resources and opportunities, both of which undermine an
attractive account of fairness central to much recent liberal political thought.
My aim here is to provide a normative analysis of the polycentric approach to
municipal governance. I offer a spatial interpretation of the account of fairness
suggested by Rawls (1999 and 2001) and elaborated as an expressly democratic
ideal by Cohen (2003). I then argue that political theorists concerned with effi-
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ciency, freedom, and fairness may be able to reconcile some of their democratic
hopes with the market metaphor that sustains the polycentric ideal. But this re-
conciliation requires that we understand polycentricity not simply in terms of effi-
ciency, but primarily in terms of fairness with respect to both spatial mobility
and loyalty to place. This in turn suggests a vision of the polycentric city in which
fairness and public contestation are as important as freedom and efficiency.
Justice as Fairness
By “fairness” I have in mind political principles and associated institutions that
seek to balance liberty with a commitment to some standard of equality.1 For my
purposes here, I adopt the account of justice as fairness advanced by Rawls (1999
and 2001) that requires inequalities of wealth and expectations to be consistent
with equal basic liberties. Furthermore, inequalities must be part of a system of
social cooperation in which similarly capable and motivated citizens face similar
life prospects (fair equality of opportunity). Given equal basic liberties and fair
equality of opportunity, inequalities must work to the greatest benefit of citizens
occupying the least advantaged position in society (the difference principle).
Justice as fairness allows that equal liberties may have unequal worth to citi-
zens as a function of differing abilities, inclinations, and especially differences
in wealth and education. But such differences in the worth of liberty are per-
missible only if they better protect other basic liberties and can be shown to do
so in ways that citizens—especially those whose liberties are of lesser worth—
can accept as reasonable (see Rawls 1999, 171–227 esp. 178–79, 187–89, and
203). The idea is that, together, fair equality of opportunity and the difference
principle ensure that the worth of liberty is maximized for those facing the least
attractive prospects in society.
Rawls offers a famously evocative argument for why we would pay so much
attention to the plight of those facing the least attractive prospects in society: such
attention is rational for parties who must agree to binding principles of justice
without appealing to specific information about their talents, beliefs, aspirations,
wealth, and social positions. Rawls asks us to imagine these parties as actually
ignorant of their particular features, instead knowing only that their agreement
on mutually binding principles is final, and that the basic structure of society
associated with any set of principles will almost certainly result in some persons
having less attractive life prospects than others. Under such conditions, rational
parties would, Rawls argues, try to ensure not only extensive personal liberties
for all, but also an adequate minimum position: they would want to guarantee
that the least attractive positions in society are nonetheless such that occupants
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1 Much work in political philosophy has examined the distributional demands of such balancing
efforts: does fairness permit any inequalities? what must be equalized, or maximized, and for whom,
to achieve a fair distribution: income? wealth? happiness? respect? employment opportunities? life
chances more generally? political influence? freedom from domination? For a sense of the nuances
of these debates see Cohen (2000), Dworkin (2000), Sen (1992), van Parijs (1991), and Varian (1975);
for a critical assessment of much of this debate, see Anderson (1999) and Scheffler (2003).
can exercise their liberties and possess sufficient means to live a satisfying 
life. After all, absent specific information about our wealth, talents, and social
positions, we cannot estimate the likelihood that we in fact occupy undesirable
positions.
Why should we think about justice in this way, divorced from specific knowl-
edge of our talents, aspirations, and social positions? Because, following a philo-
sophical tradition grounded in Kant, we tend to associate personal responsibility
with our ability to make informed, uncoerced, reasoned choices about our actions,
and more generally about the course of our lives. Central to modern liberal polit-
ical thought is the idea that, however much our particular beliefs and aspirations
are shaped by formative traditions and associations, our lives are, ultimately, best
lived according to our own judgments.
To be sure, our judgments may be intimately related to—indeed, in some cases
overwhelmingly determined by—our class position, ethnic history, cultural her-
itage, and religious beliefs. In a diverse and unequal society, the question of moral
responsibility will rarely be resolved by simple appeals to the relation between
choices and their consequences. Rather, under such conditions we may expect
rational parties to disagree about the consequences for which persons may rea-
sonably be held responsible, and the degree to which particular motives and
expectations are bound up with formative traditions that deserve our respect.
But even given such nuances, it is difficult to see how anyone could meaning-
fully be thought to deserve their inherited traits, or the wealth, compassion, and
competence of their parents, or especially the places where they are born and
raised, and that come to have significance in their lives. As Rawls (1999, 64) sug-
gests, even our talents, aspirations, and eventual positions in society are at least
to some extent morally arbitrary insofar as they can be traced not simply to our
own efforts, but also in part to unchosen features of our formative environments.
It is this intuition, paired with a commitment to the idea of citizens as free and
equal moral agents, that moves us beyond concerns for liberty and efficiency to
considerations of fairness: Rawls provides criteria for selecting among efficient
distributions of resources and opportunities that are each compatible with liberty,
but some of which offend reasonable intuitions about luck, entitlements, and our
standing as citizens.2
Consider, for instance, the plight of a citizen born into an urban neighborhood
plagued by poverty, violence, and poor services. Our citizen may enjoy a range
of liberties, protected by a scheme of rights and duties. Suppose that this scheme
results in a spatial distribution of wealth and employment opportunities more effi-
cient than distributions associated with alternative schemes. Demands for liberty
and efficiency are thus satisfied. But our unlucky citizen will find that, through
no fault of her own, her liberties have far less worth than those enjoyed by citi-
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2 Rawls (2001, 72–79) is careful to distinguish legitimate expectations and associated entitlements
from accounts of moral desert: the latter are grounded in comprehensive moral, religious, or 
philosophical doctrines, whereas the former emerge from political conceptions of justice that may be
consonant with some prevalent understandings of moral desert, but do not depend upon controver-
sial claims about religious truth, moral worth, or the nature of a good life.
zens lucky enough to be born into affluent neighborhoods with low crime rates
and good schools. Yet such divergent prospects are not unavoidable facts of
nature. Rather, the prevailing scheme of rights and duties allows—indeed, sus-
tains—inequalities that trace at least in part to arbitrary differences in formative
circumstances. Various schemes of rights and duties may satisfy reasonable
demands for liberty and efficiency, yet differ considerably in their sensitivity to
such unchosen factors. Justice as fairness offers a way to take seriously the intu-
ition that our standing as citizens ought not to be overwhelmingly determined by
unchosen contingencies, while nonetheless preserving incentives for employment
and location decisions that are grounded in liberty, foster economic innovation
and growth, and tend toward efficiency.
The Rawlsian framework achieves a principled balance between compensating
for unchosen burdens, on the one hand, and evaluating structures of power that
sustain distributive patterns, on the other.3 This balance reflects the democratic
character of Rawls’s account: the point is not simply that some burdens are uncho-
sen and hence undeserved, but that burdens and benefits are importantly influ-
enced by prevailing institutions; that these institutions ought to reflect an ideal of
citizens as free and equal partners in social cooperation; and that this ideal 
suggests the moral irrelevance, to citizenship, of certain unchosen features of
persons. Justice does not require strict insensitivity to unchosen features, such
that, for instance, distributions are both efficient and free of envy, in the sense
that no party would prefer what another party has (Varian 1974, 1975; Dworkin
2000, chapter 2). Rather, distributions should emerge from a basic structure that
reflects and sustains the equal standing of free citizens. Equal standing as 
citizens requires that we enjoy the social bases of self-respect and that political
liberties be guaranteed their fair value (Rawls 2001, 58–61 and 148–52). 
Self-respect is fundamental to exercising our liberties in pursuit of a satisfying
life, and vital to such respect is some measure of respect by others, demonstrated
“not simply by recognizing me as an equal in some way, or attributing to me some
equal rights regardless of the content of those rights, but as an equal with respect
to making the final authoritative judgements about collective affairs” (Cohen
2003, 109).
The emphasis on equal terms of citizenship in defining fairness (rather 
than, say, the absence of envy and a broader equality of resources) matters to the
following analysis: when we assess the polycentric approach in light of 
considerations of fairness thus understood, we arrive, I will argue, at a more 
democratic conception of polycentricity, according to which tensions between
freedom, fairness, and local autonomy are less pronounced. And so while justice
as fairness has been applied to the spatial forms of urban areas before, most
notably in early work by Harvey (1973, 96–118), subsequent applications (e.g.,
McConnell 1995) tend to apply the principles of justice—particularly the 
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3 The importance of such a balance is suggested by Anderson (1999, esp. 314); see also Scheffler
(2003).
difference principle—as distributional constraints imposed on democratic poli-
tics. My aim here is to treat these principles as themselves a democratic expres-
sion of liberal justice.
We might still fault Rawls for permitting incentives that conflict with his own
difference principle: some citizens with scarce talents may require sufficient
incentive to deploy those talents (a gift for applied mathematics, perhaps) instead
of others they may prefer to exercise (modest skill at poetry, say). And the reser-
vation wage they settle on for using their more socially beneficial talents may be
considerably higher than average. In such cases, the least advantaged would be
worse off under a more equitable distribution of resources not by virtue of brute
facts of allocative and productive efficiency, but rather because of the preferences
of these talented individuals. Cohen (2000, 117–47 esp. 122–28) argues that if,
as Rawls says, citizens freely affirm shared principles of justice in a just society,
then the society in question is not just, because these talented individuals are not
affirming the difference principle. Carens (1986) points out, for instance, that the
talented might instead be motivated by a duty to contribute to the common good
according to their abilities, thus generating a more equitable distribution. Of
course some, perhaps many, apparent incentive inequalities may in fact reflect
vagaries of labor markets and educational opportunities, as Cohen (2001, 374–75)
suggests. Yet even given this important caveat, the “incentive inequality” objec-
tion clarifies an important point: our sense of what we may reasonably ask of
others as we pursue a satisfying life, and what others may reasonably demand of
us in their similar pursuits, is shaped by a “social ethos.”
But as Joshua Cohen (2001) argues, the motivations behind different classes
of incentive inequalities are essential to our considerations about justice, and
some problematic motivations—racist attitudes, for instance, or an obsessive
concern with relative advantage—will be discouraged by other features of a just
basic structure, specifically the sorts of institutions that embody the priority of
equal basic liberties, a fair value of political liberties, and fair equality of oppor-
tunity. Gerald Cohen’s (2000) criticism makes clear the importance of a social
ethos in shaping preferences and expectations, but he does not acknowledge the
degree to which just institutions can transform the prevailing ethos, discourag-
ing odious preferences and inclinations, while simultaneously protecting reason-
able aspirations and associated life choices.4
The Rawlsian account of justice as fairness provides, then, a powerful and per-
suasive normative framework for evaluating political institutions and outcomes.
Given this account of fairness, I turn now to an evaluation of the polycentric
approach to municipal governance, which is arguably motivated by concerns 
for liberty, efficiency, and incentives for innovation in the provision of public
services.
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4 On these ideas consider also van Parijs (2003, 230–31), and especially Daniels (2003, esp.
267–70).
The Polycentric Approach
In a seminal article, Tiebout (1956) provides the basis for a powerful argument
in favor of granting political authority over local public service provision to
several jurisdictions, rather than opting for a more centralized system of gover-
nance and administration. Tiebout argues that, by offering bundles of services at
differing tax rates, several jurisdictions could approximate an efficient market for
public services by allowing individuals to sort themselves in space according to
their preferences, moving to jurisdictions that provide the services they most
value, at tax rates they are willing to pay. For most local public services there
will be increasing returns to scale up to a critical membership level, beyond which
increased numbers of recipients will diminish the quality of services for a given
tax rate. Thus an equilibrium should emerge, with more efficient means of pro-
viding particular bundles of public services being limited to an ideal member-
ship level and associated tax rate.
Building upon Tiebout’s work, Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961), Bish
(1971), Ostrom (1972), and Schneider (1989) have developed a polycentric
approach to municipal governance, arguing that a multiplicity of relatively inde-
pendent jurisdictions in a region is not necessarily pathological. The desirability
of such political fragmentation—specifically, the desirability of competition or
coordination among particular levels of government—needs to be assessed in
terms of the nature and scope of the specific public services being provided.
To be sure, some vital services (such as pollution control and investigation of
criminal activities that span several jurisdictions) may require a strong central
agency, either to provide the service in question (i.e., regulation and enforcement
of environmental standards), or to coordinate the efforts of local agencies (i.e.,
collecting, standardizing, and disseminating information on industrial emissions
and associated risks, or the financial transactions of suspected criminals). But
competing governments may be able to provide other services (such as schools,
recreational areas, zoning regulations, and policing) with greater sensitivity to
diverse needs and preferences.
Both Tiebout’s original model and the polycentric approach have been refor-
mulated and extended in constructive ways. For example, recent theoretical work
on the Tiebout model has examined the performance of alternative social choice
procedures in sorting citizens by preferences (Kollman, Miller, and Page 1997).
But controversy has ensued over the explanatory power of Tiebout-style models
and, more critically, the desirability of associated policy prescriptions.
Tiebout’s model made strong informational demands: for spatial sorting to
result in efficient service provision, citizens must be sufficiently informed about
the quality and costs of services in competing jurisdictions. Lowery and Lyons
(1989) argue that this condition may be difficult to satisfy, although subsequent
research by Percy and Hawkins (1992) has qualified the generality of these find-
ings. Indeed, Ostrom (1977) suggests that citizens may sometimes be able to
make reasonable estimates of service quality, especially near their homes, and
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Teske et al. (1993) further suggest that a relatively small number of informed
citizen-consumers may sustain competitive outcomes in such settings.
We should, however, be concerned that informed citizens may be difficult to
identify, and so any first movers might generate perverse cascades: Scharfstein
and Stein (1990) and Banerjee (1992) argue that, in markets with imperfect infor-
mation and “first mover” advantages, some otherwise-prudent actors may dis-
count private information in favor of public signals generated by first movers.
Furthermore, there is an incentive for some providers to misrepresent the quality
of their services so as to make themselves indistinguishable from higher-quality
providers. Anticipating this, consumers may discount information gained from
any providers, thus undervaluing higher-quality services (Akerloff 1970). If these
services tend to be discounted too sharply, and if entry costs are high for new
providers, then higher-quality services may be underprovided. It seems to follow
that, in the absence of timely and reliable sources of information available to 
consumers, markets for public services are unlikely to be competitive.
Tiebout’s analysis also assumed a high degree of mobility, a condition that is
only rarely met in reality, and even then only for those with sufficient wealth and
few, if any, vested interests in their current locations. Although some businesses
may accept the costs of relocation, given expectations about market demand and
regulatory environments, the assumption seems unrealistic for individuals and
families. Financing a new home is an expensive and time-consuming process,
and there are significant personal costs involved in leaving behind friends and
familiar habits and institutions, and forging new ties elsewhere. Families may
well choose to move elsewhere for safer streets and better schools if their present
circumstances are dire enough, and their income allows them to move (on this
consider the findings of Hoyt and Rosenthal 1997). But we should not expect
repeated moves whenever tax rates and service quality fluctuate.
Following an influential analysis by Hirschman (1970), Lyons and Lowery
(1986) have pointed out that political activity is an obvious alternative to exit
when citizens are dissatisfied with current services in their jurisdiction.
Hirschman suggests that loyalty to particular organizations—or in this case, par-
ticular places with distinct bundles of public services, community associations,
and political organizations—is likely to emerge (1) when voice requires consid-
erable effort but is, with some creativity, likely to exert a positive influence, and
(2) where exit is feasible but threatens significant costs (1970, chapter 7, esp.
78–82 and 98–105). Given that effective opportunities for exit tend to be 
dramatically constrained for less-affluent citizens, especially in urban areas with
poor services and concentrated poverty, we might expect loyalty to emerge 
in these neighborhoods as residents voice pressing concerns and seek to bring
about much-needed change through creative forms of protest and community
organization.
But voice is unlikely to be effective in just these settings: given limited house-
hold income and assets, threats of exit are not credible, and even if they were,
local officials face rigid constraints in financing public services, regardless of the
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intensity and creativity of residents’ efforts to foster change. Furthermore, the
cause of these constraints on citizens and officials is arguably the very combina-
tion of spatial sorting and local control that is central to the polycentric model.5
Mobility against Injustice
Much of the popular appeal of the polycentric approach lies in the hope that
mobility and jurisdictional autonomy will together force governments to be more
responsive to citizens: the threat of exit ensures accountability and fosters inno-
vation in the face of changing demands. But some citizens are burdened by
poverty and poor services, and these citizens cannot opt to leave their jurisdic-
tion, arguably through no fault of their own, and indeed quite possibly due in part
to past and enduring injustice.6
Theorists of a liberal persuasion may argue that, given these realities, we
should intervene to enhance mobility for just these citizens, using state and
federal tax revenues to support home rental and school voucher programs, edu-
cation incentives, job training programs, and aggressive enforcement of existing
statutes against discrimination by employers, banks, and realtors. By making exit
a feasible option for all citizens we ensure that no one is forced to endure inept
or unresponsive government.
Fiss (2003) suggests such a policy, focusing on the lamentable situation
endured by many residents of central city neighborhoods in the United States. In
contrast to community-oriented initiatives that seek to revitalize distressed urban
neighborhoods, Fiss’s solution extends the intuition behind the 1976 U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Hills v. Gautreaux. This ruling upheld a lower court
judgement, in 1969, that both the Chicago Housing Authority and the federal
Department of Housing and Urban Development bore responsibility for racial
segregation in their location decisions for public housing within the city of
Chicago. The resulting Gautreaux program allowed residents of, and approved
applicants for, public housing to relocate throughout the Chicago metropolitan
area (see Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000).
But Fiss’s proposal is not limited to current residents of public housing in U.S.
central cities. Rather, his is a more ambitious effort to break up concentrated
poverty and social isolation of distressed neighborhoods throughout U.S. metro-
politan areas, by using government programs and subsidies to create incentives
for relocation by current residents to safer middle-class and racially integrated
neighborhoods closer to employment opportunities and good schools. The 
physical spaces of distressed areas can then be left to private developers, to be
transformed as markets dictate.
210 Loren A. King
5 On this point see Hill (1974). But see also Ostrom (1983) and Morgan and Mareschal (1999).
6 I think “justice as fairness” provides sufficient reason to be troubled by these burdens, but Shklar
(1990) offers further support for such concern in an illuminating analysis of when misfortune may
be, or become, an injustice.
The Gautreaux program is not, of course, the only (or even the most promi-
nent) attempt to solve the seemingly intractable problem of the urban ghetto.
Federal and state welfare reform, and tougher police tactics in central cities, are
prominent recent initiatives, and in the long term they might have the desired
consequence of breaking the self-perpetuating cycle of poverty, broken families,
and welfare dependence within distressed central city neighborhoods. But the
more immediate consequence of such measures has arguably been to exacerbate
the painful results of a vicious cycle of poverty, racial discrimination, and frac-
tured communities. Welfare reform has been justified to voters as a way to
increase the efficiency of government by eliminating ineffective programs that
have always been prone to exploitation; and certainly the trend toward tougher
police tactics in cities such as New York has been politically popular, in that offi-
cials can appeal to safer city streets for affluent (and predominantly white) urban
residents and suburban or out-of-town visitors. But these measures risk reifying
the treatment of symptoms—petty crime, vandalism, drug use, welfare depend-
ence—at the expense of careful attention to the underlying pathologies that gen-
erate and sustain these symptoms.
A more promising set of policies have involved efforts to intervene in the cycle
of poverty, unemployment, welfare dependence, parental neglect, and general
culture of despair and violence characteristic of the ghetto. The cycle begins early
in a child’s life growing up in the ghetto, and efforts such as Head Start have tried
to intervene early, to provide children with better guidance than they might oth-
erwise receive in broken homes and fractured neighborhoods, arguably with some
modest degree of success (Currie and Thomas 1995; Currie 2001). Similar efforts
have attempted to use public school curricula or neighborhood youth organiza-
tions to impart upon children the values of personal responsibility, self-respect,
care for others, and a love of learning. But as Fiss notes, these programs can only
reach so far into the lives of children and adolescents: eventually the child or teen
must return home from the school or community center, and if their home life or
neighborhood is grossly inadequate, then these programs can have little effect
there.
And then there are efforts to bring investment and employment back into the
ghetto, along with improved access to credit and job training programs, and
reform of public schools and other services. Community-based initiatives such
as Chicago’s South Shore Bank (Taub 1988), Boston’s Dudley Street Neighbor-
hood Initiative (Medoff and Sklar 1994), FINCA’s and Accion’s microcredit
efforts in several U.S. cities, and a variety of faith-based community initiatives
seem to have some positive social and economic impact, however modest. These
community-oriented initiatives help citizens transform their neighborhoods in the
face of marginalization by existing economic and political institutions.
Such initiatives—especially those offering financial services and training pro-
grams—do not, however, seem to be especially beneficial to the poorest and most
troubled members of the communities they serve (Bates 1995; and Servon and
Bates 1998), and Fiss is surely correct to suggest that these reform efforts must
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fight an uphill battle against the many attitudes and incentives, both within and
outside of distressed communities, that sustain poverty and isolation. Indeed,
when efforts such as community banks and job training programs are successful,
they may well have the perverse consequence of robbing communities of poten-
tial role models. These programs tend to select for those residents who already
possess sufficient motivation and some level of education and training. When
these participants have been taught specific skills, given the necessary resources,
and encouraged to succeed in, say, a business venture or community development
project, they may eventually choose to leave their current locations, in search of
more personally satisfying and financially lucrative opportunities elsewhere.
But the departure of talented and motivated citizens from distressed areas may
not be a bad thing, an observation that leads to Fiss’s proposal: generate oppor-
tunities for people to escape poverty and poor services, and to settle instead in
communities with good public services, and close to a variety of employment
opportunities. Such a project will be long and expensive, to be sure. And it will
involve more than simply rent vouchers and reform of some zoning ordinances
in relatively affluent residential neighborhoods: also required are the vigorous
enforcement of antidiscrimination laws in realty and home financing, as well as
supplementary education and job training programs, so that new residents can
take advantage of available opportunities.
Fiss is drawing on the intuition that, given the chance, many residents of poor
and isolated urban ghettos would choose to find a home and job somewhere else,
if only their mobility were not severely restricted. After all, as with any neigh-
borhood, most ghetto residents are honest citizens who would prefer a secure job
located in or near a safe neighborhood with reliable public services and good
schools: like so many other citizens, they want the chance to build wealth for
themselves and their families.7 A critical factor preventing these citizens from
achieving their desired ends is the spatial structure of contemporary urban
economies, and the exclusionary politics that prevents job seekers in the central
city from locating near, or even easily commuting to and from, jobs in outlying
areas. Given these conditions (and given historical legacies of oppression and dis-
crimination they arguably reflect), Fiss suggests that, as a point of justice, we owe
citizens of these neighborhoods the chance to leave and to find safe residence
and gainful employment elsewhere.8
I share Fiss’s sense that there are good reasons to challenge the motives
behind—and the incentives that sustain—cultural, class, and racial homogeneity
in U.S. metropolitan areas, even if the costs of such a challenge are formidable.
Indeed, the use of tax revenues to support such a sweeping venture seems emi-
nently justifiable. After all, such uses of public funds and state powers are not
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personal and household assets; see Oliver and Shapiro (1995) and Conley (1999).
8 Could we generalize this line of argument beyond troubled neighborhoods in U.S. cities? On the
one hand, the “mobility” metaphor seems to resonate with particular force in the United States: “the
simply the redistributive efforts criticized by libertarians such as Nozick (1974),
and viewed with scepticism by scholars such as Epstein (1985). Rather, redis-
tributive efforts in this case arguably represent an effort to correct past injustices
and, in so doing, to establish fair terms of political organization and economic
activity that reasonable citizens would, upon informed reflection, accept as con-
sonant with justice.
Nozick seems to allow for redistribution to rectify past injustice (1974,
152–53). Fairness, however, is not an acceptable rationale, because sustaining a
fair distribution inevitably involves restricting the liberty of some to use their
property without undue interference by others. Liberty, Nozick famously argued,
disrupts such patterns (163–64). But the force of Rawls’s account of justice as
fairness is that it grounds our considerations of justice not in foundational
Lockean claims about self-ownership, acquisition, and entitlement, but in the rea-
sonable expectations of rational parties, who seek terms of social cooperation that
embody the idea of citizens as free and equal persons with distinct values and
aspirations. Rawls’s approach is thus political in a sense that Nozick’s is not.
To see why, consider that Rawls asks us what sorts of reasons we ought to find
persuasive in accepting binding principles of justice, given that we must treat one
another as free and equal. Nozick’s “historical entitlement” approach, in contrast,
justifies distributions according to whether they arise from acquisition by, and
exchange among, free persons who ultimately own their bodies and their labor
power. But this approach trades off freedom against equality in such a way that,
over time, the liberties of some will have dramatically less worth than those of
others, owing in large part to the choices of past generations, and also to the luck
of those positioned favorably in the initial distribution of natural resources.
Suppose instead that we imagine rational agents under conditions of moderate
scarcity, coming together to decide on binding principles of social cooperation
for themselves and subsequent generations. They will surely anticipate that, under
the principles Nozick endorses, liberties will be of unequal worth for some,
perhaps many citizens at some point in the future, and that this outcome is likely
to obtain for a wide range of possible initial distributions of talents and resources.
If these parties were uncertain about the likelihood of ending up in a favorable
region of the expected distribution—indeed, so uncertain that they had no plau-
sible basis for estimating such likelihoods—then why would they agree to
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frontier” has always held economic, political, and imaginative importance, and in popular culture we
find an enduring theme of personal growth through travel and settlement in new places, paired with
a deep ambivalence about urban life. Given this history, it may be that market-based mobility poli-
cies are more relevant to U.S. metropolitan areas than, say, comparable regions in Canada or Europe
with rather different political, economic, geographical, and cultural histories. But on the other hand,
the idea that undesirable location may be an unchosen burden, and the suspicion that enhanced mobil-
ity might foster efficiency and accountability, both seem broadly applicable, especially in regions
where wealth, opportunities, and quality of government vary considerably. Indeed, ongoing arguments
about international distributive justice, and immigration laws and the treatment of foreign workers,
suggest the broader relevance of location and mobility to questions of justice.
Nozick’s principles without some qualifications to mitigate against situations
where their liberties have little worth, regardless of their choices? If we accept
the idea that citizens are free and equal moral persons with the capacity to act
according to their own values and judgements, and also that legitimate expecta-
tions and entitlements are ultimately grounded in autonomous choice by such
agents, then this thought experiment is how we ought to evaluate the acceptabil-
ity of principles of justice. Nozick takes seriously the idea that citizens are
autonomous moral agents, but not the intuition that the basic structure of society
should be consonant with their reasonable judgements about responsibility, 
entitlement, and the equal standing of citizens.
Fiss’s proposed redistributive efforts ought to be understood in this Rawlsian
way because prevalent patterns of spatial exclusion in American metropolitan
regions represent an interference with the fair worth of liberty and fair equality
of life chances; as such, these patterns offend the ideal of citizens as free and
equal. By virtue of the choices of others, liberties have little value for some cit-
izens in particular locations, and it cannot plausibly be argued that these unequal
life chances, stemming from poverty and constrained mobility, are such that they
are not only Pareto-efficient, but also maximize the worth of liberty for the least
advantaged, and thus ought to be accepted as reasonable by all citizens, includ-
ing those facing diminished life prospects. Or at least no such argument is gen-
erally made, beyond the suggestion that efficiency is beneficial to all. We need
not dispute this limited claim, of course; but it does not follow that alternative
institutional arrangements and resultant spatial distributions of resources and
opportunities cannot remain at (or sufficiently near) the Pareto frontier, and yet
also enhance the prospects of the least advantaged.
Is Mobility Enough?
Insofar as the Gautreaux program has been successful, it has involved a process
of racial integration and class assimilation. Several of the former ghetto residents
who chose to relocate to suburban areas have raised themselves and their fami-
lies into the American middle-class. They have found employment, learned new
skills, made new friends, and provided for their children, who can now attend
good schools in safe neighborhoods. Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum (2000) found
that although many Gautreaux participants experienced setbacks and discourag-
ing encounters after moving to more affluent neighborhoods, they were nonethe-
less relatively successful in integrating into these (predominantly white and
middle-class) suburban communities. Racial discrimination by established resi-
dents (in the form of outright harassment or more subtle forms of exclusion from
neighborhood activities) tended to decrease over time.
Of course, as Fiss and Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum note, the Gautreaux
program was rather modest in scope, and when relocation involved placement in
suburban neighborhoods rather than other city locations, generally only a few
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(and almost always black) families at a time would be placed, and in neighbor-
hoods whose residents were predominantly white. Even if more ambitious 
integration efforts are attempted along the lines Fiss proposes, and even if these
more ambitious efforts result in successful integration across racial lines, there
are questions of whether the resulting class homogeneity is desirable, and what
is to be done when citizens are unable or unwilling to assimilate in this way.
Exclusionary Motivations
Recent work by Oliver (1999) suggests that local political participation 
within metropolitan jurisdictions diminishes with greater affluence and class
homogeneity, suggesting that, by encouraging citizens to sort themselves accord-
ing to preferences into economically homogeneous and relatively independent
political jurisdictions, we diminish the likelihood of fruitful political cooperation
across these spatial boundaries and associated class differences. Furthermore,
when affluent urban and suburban citizens do participate in local affairs it is 
often in divisive zoning disputes or “not in my backyard” activism against 
developments that might threaten property values. Relatively affluent homeown-
ers often wish to prevent construction of affordable housing options in their
neighborhoods, and stifling opposition can arise to proposed bus routes to better
serve central city workers commuting to jobs in or near affluent suburban 
neighborhoods. Considerable opposition may arise even to uses of local and 
state tax revenues that promise clear benefits and reasonable costs, such as drug
treatment programs, subsidized prenatal care and parent training, and job train-
ing initiatives.
For the political theorist who is committed on the one hand to a fair equality
of life chances, and on the other hand to an inclusive public sphere in which
bearers of diverse values, interests, and expressive styles can find a hearing, the
problem is not simply that mobility initiatives seem to allow political indiffer-
ence, but that they are associated with outright exclusionary politics aimed at pre-
serving a spatial status quo with respect to class—and generally also racial and
cultural—homogeneity. Enhanced mobility might succeed in fostering racial inte-
gration, but it still allows affluent citizens to sequester themselves from others
and to think of politics largely in terms of reinforcing the spatial boundaries of
class-differentiated neighborhoods.
This last concern deserves particular emphasis: the worry for democratic
theory raised by Oliver’s findings is not merely that political engagement and par-
ticipation may decline with economic homogeneity. Rather, the concern is that
the political imagination of affluent citizens may be constrained in ways harmful
to democratic aspirations: if there are few visceral and enduring experiences of
public life beyond carefully policed urban and suburban enclaves, then there is
unlikely to be much willingness on the part of affluent citizens to imagine citi-
zenship as requiring more than occasional fleeting acts of engagement across a
variety of personal differences and spatial scales.
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Exclusion, Fairness, and Loyalty to Place
Mobility initiatives seem to allow for exclusionary motivations and activities
among the affluent. They do, however, promise to help sufficiently motivated cit-
izens become more affluent, integrating into more desirable neighborhoods than
those they leave behind. Some might conclude that this is the best that can be
done for those citizens who, by brute bad luck, were born into a ghetto and never
gained the necessary skills and motivation to enable them to leave, even when
exit is subsidized.
Some citizens may, however, choose to remain in distressed neighborhoods for
reasons that other citizens of a free and fair polity have no good cause to dispute.
Increasingly, liberals have come to accept the normative importance of commu-
nity membership to the meaningful exercise of personal liberty. But communi-
ties—especially the characteristic institutions of formative communities: schools,
churches, neighborhood associations, even parks and cafés—are almost always
bound to specific locations, particular places. Such places come to have signifi-
cance as sites of rituals, habits, and encounters that eventually define who we take
ourselves to be, as persons and citizens.
Loyalty to particular places may, of course, importantly reflect assessments of
tangible personal benefits (for individuals and families), and strategic consider-
ations (especially for firms, given transportation costs and the spatial distribution
of consumers and competitors).9 In all likelihood, however, free citizens will also
develop loyalties to particular places as sites of formative associations and prac-
tices. Such valuations of places are difficult to weigh against more tangible costs
and benefits associated with specific locations, certainly. But if we value fair
equality of life chances, then loyalty grounded in constitutive attachments should
be a real possibility for those who wish to stay and improve their neighborhoods
within the city limits. Even fractured and impoverished neighborhoods may be
sites of formative experiences and shared rituals. Certainly we must not roman-
ticize such spaces and attachments. But given this important caveat, liberals must
acknowledge the reasonableness of the desire, on the part of some residents in
such places, to work for change in their neighborhoods, to transform their shared
spaces from within, exerting meaningful influence over land uses, policing, and
schooling—as, for instance, Fung (2001) finds in recent Chicago community 
initiatives, and as Medoff and Sklar (1994) find in Boston’s Dudley Street 
Neighborhood Initiative, a vigorously inclusive community association that 
itself holds eminent domain authority over local properties.
But whatever its source, loyalty to place ought not to be expressed through
exclusionary practices and institutions that offend the ideal of citizens as free and
equal. We are led to this stance not only out of a concern for those left behind,
but as a way to ensure that all citizens have available to them feasible opportu-
nities to play an active role in discussions, negotiations, and activities about public
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services and land uses that affect their life chances. If we seek to enhance the
liberal-democratic credentials of metropolitan areas, it will not suffice simply to
enhance opportunities for employment and residence across boundaries of class,
race, and culture. We must also attend to the processes that generate and sustain
these boundaries, by ensuring that marginalized voices have realistic opportuni-
ties to alter the spatial status quo.
There are obvious difficulties associated with putting this normative stance into
practice, and I cannot do justice here to the complex question of how best to
implement the fair worth of political liberty in municipal settings, at least not
beyond the argument I have offered that some such implementation seems clearly
to be a demand of justice. Again, there have been some promising innovations in
local democratic representation that seem to allow many residents to exert mean-
ingful influence over public agendas, especially concerning land uses, school cur-
ricula, and community policing. But there are obvious structural factors that
hinder any more ambitious efforts to replicate these innovations. There are, for
instance, dramatic geographical differences among North American urban areas,
in terms of available land, and past commercial land uses that constrain subse-
quent development. Furthermore, in just those jurisdictions that demand reform
as a point of justice, local officials face rigid budget constraints, making it diffi-
cult to improve services, even when residents suggest plausible alternative pro-
vision and management strategies. And insofar as industrial and other commercial
properties in some low-income areas hold the promise of significant tax revenues,
officials may be reluctant to exploit these commercial interests for public pur-
poses: in such settings, local administrations tend to privilege business interests
that either have a great deal invested in relatively fixed locations within their juris-
dictions, or hold the promise of such investment. In addition to generating incen-
tives for corruption within revenue-strapped administrations, this systematic bias
also gives these interests greater effective voice in local politics, particularly on
issues of land use and taxation. Because of this systematic bias, the costs and
benefits associated with many location decisions tend to be assessed in terms of
these privileged interests, while the costs borne by other, less advantaged 
citizens—for instance, lowered property values, disrupted neighborhoods, shift-
ing patterns of employment, and exposure to pollutants—are often discounted
(see Harvey 1973, chapter 2; and 1989, chapters 1 and 5; Elkin 1987, chapters
3–5; and Imbroscio 1997, chapters 1–2).
Given these tendencies, what must be prevented, on any effort to achieve fair
opportunity for loyalty to place (and the fair equality of political influence that
this implies), are uses of local political institutions and informal social mecha-
nisms to control access to, and acceptable uses of, particular spaces in ways that
merely sustain location-specific inequalities of resources, and of life chances
more generally. Considerations of fairness set limits to jurisdictional autonomy:
the requirement of fair influence over land uses and public services does not
justify the effective sovereignty of any metropolitan jurisdiction or organization,
wealthy or poor.
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Thus the commitment to fair opportunities for loyalty to place puts limits on
fragmentation and localism: centralized authority is necessary to provide some
essential services, and to coordinate information, monitoring, and enforcement
across multiple jurisdictions.10 And one such service—vital for realizing a more
democratic conception of polycentricity—is ensuring that local autonomy does
not sustain objectionable inequalities of life chances. But given such an author-
ity, governments may be able to deploy some degree of fragmentation to liberal
and democratic ends, using both mobility and place-based reform initiatives to
address injustices and foster responsive government, while ensuring that spatial
boundaries between metropolitan jurisdictions are fragile and permeable, thus
preventing some residents from using freedom of association and local autonomy
to undermine the fair worth of liberties, and fair equality of life chances, for
others.
Democratic Hopes: Fairness and Fragile Boundaries
The polycentric model seems to be implicated with exclusionary practices and
rather stark inequalities of wealth and opportunities. Liberals such as Fiss are
right to find in mobility a potentially powerful tool for addressing spatial injus-
tice: mobility programs promise to diminish objectionable inequalities by encour-
aging exit from undesirable locations, and integration into more desirable
neighborhoods with better services. But while desirable, mobility alone is insuf-
ficient to address the problems for liberal democracy associated with class homo-
geneity and exclusionary motives in local politics: if our enthusiasm for enhanced
mobility is motivated by a desire to achieve not only more responsive govern-
ment but also a fair equality of life chances, then we should be concerned that
mobility-oriented programs threaten to drive a wedge between liberal concerns
and democratic hopes.
Given this, we might conclude that political theorists interested in reconciling
freedom with fairness should move on, searching instead for a model of urban
governance that promises more equitable and inclusive politics than those asso-
ciated with either the polycentric model or liberal mobility initiatives. The poly-
centric model seems to reify individual preferences at the expense of fairness and
a diverse and inclusive public sphere, instead understanding the public interest
simply in terms of efficiency with respect to local public service provision. And
although the mobility approach does lead us to challenge urban injustice, it seems
to counsel mobility at the expense of place-based reforms, and in doing so threat-
ens to leave in place objectionable strategies of exclusion. Indeed, enhanced
mobility undermines the possibility of loyalty to place for the less-affluent, yet
allows such loyalty to be expressed in exclusionary ways by the affluent.
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We thus have good reasons to be sceptical of the polycentric approach as a
liberal and democratic ideal of municipal governance. But the market metaphor
underlying this approach has considerable intuitive appeal, and so I ask political
theorists to pause and consider an alternative understanding of polycentricity in
light of the analysis I have offered here.
The problem with the polycentric approach, as it has generally been under-
stood, is the failure to regulate political practices that maintain economically and
culturally homogeneous enclaves within and around central cities. This removes
the possibility of conflict that comes with heterogeneity, an outcome that may
seem desirable to those with vested interests in high property values and a certain
neighborhood “character,” but that limits the possibility of constructive political
engagement across differences, by citizens understood as free and equal, and
acting within institutions that respect them as such.
We should not, then, be persuaded by the claim that freedom of association
(particularly regarding locational choices) and jurisdictional autonomy (espe-
cially regarding land uses) are unquestionably democratic virtues. Rather, the
democratic character of personal liberty and collective autonomy in cities and
their regions depend upon how these commitments are balanced, both within and
across jurisdictions. I have argued that justice as fairness provides an attractive
account of such a balance, and once we take seriously the democratic credentials
of this understanding of fairness, we are moved from considerations of mobility
and efficiency to adopt further commitments to loyalty and contestation, espe-
cially as these play out across urban space.
To be sure, the motivations of citizens matter a great deal to the feasibility of
this vision as a guide to policy, but the preferences and motivations of citizens
are not exogenous to institutions: a just basic structure will favor aspirations and
expectations in accord with an ideal of citizens as free and equal. How might this
play out in a city whose boundaries and associated legal architecture take seri-
ously commitments to mobility and loyalty to place, liberty, and fair equality of
life chances? Sennett (1970, 147–48; 1990, 134–37) hopes that we can foster and
sustain the sort of citizen suited to encounters across difference in urban settings,
by avoiding centralized authority structures whenever possible, and ensuring that
planning does not seek to shape city spaces according to some antecedent plan
of the well-ordered, functional city. Sennett proposes to let historical relations
between citizens themselves define the institutional forms characteristic of the
spaces they occupy. The spatial forms of metropolitan areas must not reflect only
one dominant vision of how and where people ought to live; and more impor-
tantly, insofar as some such visions become predominant, they must not constrain
the possibilities for alternative ways of living. To avoid such constraints, people
must be aware of how their interests and activities affect others and must accept
that other values and perspectives may reasonably be brought to bear on their
own; there must be ample opportunities for conflict, experimentation, and learn-
ing among citizens.
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In many cities we often find citizens rejecting a strong central authority (cer-
tainly on matters of land use, although perhaps less so on issues of security). This
is certainly in accord with Sennett’s proposal. But many affluent citizens simul-
taneously subscribe to a particular vision of ideal spatial form (i.e., the “charac-
ter” of their neighborhoods), and actively seek to realize this ideal in their location
decisions, and in local political activities. Whether the result of central planning
or decentralized politics, the shaping of urban areas into economically homoge-
neous zones—with limited land uses and considerable autonomy—amounts to an
objectionably rigid metropolitan order. We should instead let order emerge as a
tentative and fragile stasis in the multifaceted process of social cooperation
among the bearers of diverse values and interests, who must find ways to iden-
tify and pursue shared ends across cultural, moral, racial, and class differences.
Several political theorists share this concern with the democratic potential of
urban diversity and disorder (Bickford 2000; Ryan 1998; Young 1990), drawing
upon Sennett’s vision, but also the influential work of Jacobs (1961). The hope
is that we can find, in the density, diversity, and interdependence of modern city
life, a soil in which an engaged public and responsive institutions might flourish,
without threatening freedom and stifling diversity. Such a vision of metropolitan
democracy may well be attainable, or at least reasonably approximated, in some-
thing very much like the polycentric city, if we ensure that the search for effi-
ciency and governmental responsiveness through political fragmentation does not
undermine the possibility of loyalty to particular places, associated opportunities
for effective voice, and fruitful exchanges among citizens across boundaries and
especially differences of socioeconomic class.
Again, this suggests a certain fragility to existing boundaries. Boundaries
should be meaningful, giving citizens opportunities for real influence over the
character of their shared public spaces. But the fruits of such influence are not
exempt from calls for public justification, both within and across jurisdictions.
And if reasons are not offered, or if they are inconsistent with the ideal of citi-
zens as free and equal, then justice may require that we apply centralized author-
ity across existing boundaries, challenging jurisdictional autonomy over land uses
and locational choices, so as to prevent citizens from sorting and sequestering
themselves in ways that impose unreasonable burdens on others and generate
objectionable differences in the worth of liberty.
We can, given this richer understanding of polycentricity, acknowledge the
appeal of spatial sorting and decentralized authority, without becoming mere
apologists for fragmentation and localism. We are led instead to an ethically
attractive vision of city life, grounded in a spatial and democratic interpretation
of justice as fairness.
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